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We are addressing this letter to the editors of ​Philosophical Psychology ​after reading an article 
they decided to publish in the recent vol. 33, issue 1. The article is by Nathan Cofnas and is 
entitled “Research on group differences in intelligence: A defense of free inquiry” (2020). The 
purpose of our letter is ​not​ to invite Cofnas’s contribution into a broader dialogue, but to 
respectfully voice our concerns about the decision to publish the manuscript, which, in our 
opinion, fails to meet a range of academic quality standards usually expected of academic 
publications.  
 
As we read it, Cofnas’s article is a defense of the pursuit of the hereditarian scientific program 
that explores the alleged genomic differences in IQ between “racially” defined populations (e.g., 
“Blacks” vs. “Whites”), claiming that there is a strong and unfortunate tendency among 
researchers to ignore this line of research due to moral reservations. Cofnas argues that racial 
classifications, insofar as these may have discrete genetic correlates, could one day partially 
explain the differences measured in IQ between various populations; ignoring this hypothesis, 
Cofnas holds, could have potentially harmful consequences. 
 
There are, however, several critical problems with Cofnas’s piece, which we believe should have 
either disqualified the manuscript upon submission or been addressed during the review process 
and resulted in substantial revisions. Here we outline what we see as the most pressing issues: 
  
The first problem we find with Cofnas’s contribution is related to its implicit endorsement of 
racial realism​: the idea that the human species is naturally divided into many clusters of 
biologically discrete/different populations.  Although the theory of racial realism is not 2
problematic in and of itself, Cofnas makes it problematic by representing the theory as ​scientific 
1 This manuscript was originally submitted to ​Philosophical Psychology​ on January 22, 2020. It was rejected by the 
journal on March 4, 2020. The editors’ response is included below in ​Appendix A​.  
2 While Cofnas is mostly speaking about hereditarianism – the idea that the differences in phenotypic and 
psychological traits we measure between human individuals can be significantly explained by hereditary genetic 
differences – he also suggests that hereditary genetics may map onto a “racial” classification of populations, which 
implies that Cofnas accepts racialism or racial realism. This observation is also made by the editors of ​Philosophical 
Psychology​ in their ​editors’ note​ (van Leeuwen & Herschbach, 2020).  
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when he suggests that science could soon discover racially grounded genetic explanations of 
differences in intelligence between human populations (Cofnas, 2020, pp. 126-127). This way of 
representing unproven metaphysical theories ​as if​ they are scientifically sound crucially 
oversteps the extent of speculation usually tolerated in philosophy journals. 
 
There is no evidence from the study of human biological variation that suggests that racial 
realism is true, and neither is it the case that scientific insights are restrained by an ​absence of 
evidence​. Moreover, the idea that the human species is divided into genetically discrete “races” 
has for long been refuted as empirically unsupportable.  
 
An abundance of evidence about the human evolutionary lineage shows that no human groups 
were ever phylogenetically distinct in the way that racial realism posits. Put differently, the 
human species never persisted in multiple sufficiently isolated “pure” groups for such a 
prolonged time that it would, evolutionarily speaking, make sense to talk about our species being 
divided into biologically distinct populations. Indeed, migration in and between continents and 
regions was never one-way, but evidently an intricate multi-way network of substantial 
intersection and interaction. Because of this mobility, the genetic variation within the human 
species is much more complex than what racial realism presumes or predicts (e.g., Ackermann, 
Mackay, & Arnold, 2016; Marks, 2017; Rosenberg et al., 2002; Scerri et al., 2018; Tishkoff & 
Kidd, 2004). 
 
The evidence of human genetic diversity – and the rejection of racial realism that it leads to – is 
not scientifically controversial, but has been part of the established and common knowledge in 
the natural sciences at least since the completion of the ​Human Genome Project​ in 2003 (e.g., 
Patrinos, 2004). This abundance of evidence has led to no shortage of quality popular writings on 
the topic. For instance, Jonathan Marks has recently summarized why racialism is unscientific in 
his book, ​Is Science Racist? Debating Race ​(2017). Similar publications come to mind, including 
Angela Saini’s ​Superior ​(2019), Michael Yudell’s ​Race Unmasked​ (2014), Robert Sussman’s 
The Myth of Race ​(2014), and Tattersall & DeSalle’s ​Race? Debunking a Scientific Myth​ (2011)​.  
 
With regards to scientific consensus, on March 27, 2019, the ​American Association of Physical 
Anthropology ​(AAPA) published a (revised) statement denouncing racial realism (Fuentes et al., 
2019), a message that is evidently acknowledged by the vast majority of biological 
anthropologists and geneticists (e.g., ASGH, 2018; Wagner et al., 2017). One paragraph in the 
AAPA ​statement stands in particularly stark contrast to the underlying viewpoint in Cofnas’s 
contribution, namely: 
  
Humans share the vast majority (99.9%) of our DNA in common. Individuals 
nevertheless exhibit substantial genetic and phenotypic variability. 
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Genome/environment interactions, local and regional biological changes through 
time, and genetic exchange among populations have produced the biological 
diversity we see in humans today. Notably, variants are not distributed across our 
species in a manner that maps clearly onto socially-recognized racial groups. This 
is true even for aspects of human variation that we frequently emphasize in 
discussions of race, such as facial features, skin color and hair type. No group of 
people is, or ever has been, biologically homogeneous or “pure”. Furthermore, 
human populations are not – and never have been – biologically discrete, truly 
isolated, or fixed. 
  
The conspicuous absence of this literature in Cofnas’s contribution suggests that either Cofnas 
was unaware of it or deliberately ignored it when preparing his manuscript. Perhaps more to the 
point, the fact that the peer-review process allowed his paper to be published without addressing 
this gap indicates that it was not subjected to competent and detailed scrutiny. After all, 
acknowledging the scientific literature on human genetic variation undoubtedly challenges the 
entire rationale of Cofnas’s paper, which would be unmotivated if his assumption of racial 
realism were denied.  
 
A second problem with Cofnas’s piece is that it appears to be guilty of making a ​strawman 
fallacy​ of sizable proportions, a type of logical fallacy that reviewers and editors of philosophical 
journals are typically very alert to. Allegedly, Cofnas felt compelled to write this article because 
he thinks that scientists’ and philosophers’ moral qualms have led them to abandon research into 
average IQ differences between “races”. He seems to think that important truths will be lost in 
this process of looking the other way. But this perspective is significantly out of tune with 
reality; a serious academic discussion of the race/IQ gap has been ongoing (at least) since 
Jensen’s “How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement” (1969) and the volume, if 
anything, has increased since Herrnstein & Murray’s ​The Bell Curve ​(1994). Journals like 
Intelligence​ and ​Psych​ frequently publish contributions exploring the issue; even the sheer 
amount of citations in Cofnas’s paper appears to contradict its own thesis that research is being 
suppressed by extra-scientific motives.  
 
However, while it is true that most researchers in the area of human genetics and human 
biological diversity no longer allocate significant resources and time to the race/IQ discussion, 
and that moral concerns may play an important role in these decisions, an equally fundamental 
reason why researchers do not engage with the thesis is that empirical evidence shows that the 
whole idea itself is unintelligible and wrong-headed (as we have briefly addressed above). 
 
Ironically, the reason why most modern-day scientists ignore race/IQ research might actually be 
grounded in the same type of utilitarian logic that Cofnas considers in his contribution, namely, 
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that scientists simply use their scarce resources on research that, for all they know, is likely to 
bring the ​most​ benefit and novel insight. Whereas Cofnas is concerned that a lack of research 
into the race/IQ topic may lead to harmful consequences, real scientists are similarly concerned 
that directing their resources toward nonsensical ideas (such as “racially” discrete hereditary 
differences in intelligence) would deprive themselves and the rest of humanity of the benefits 
that would otherwise have followed from pursuing more promising and meaningful lines of 
inquiry. 
 
A third problem we see with Cofnas’s piece relates to the editorial decision to justify the 
publication in a separate ​editors’ note ​(van Leeuwen & Herschbach, 2020). Here​ ​the editors 
correctly acknowledge that Cofnas’s article is “controversial” partly due to its implicit 
endorsement of racial realism. However, from a scientific perspective, the editors appear to get 
things seriously wrong when they conclude that: “Cofnas’ paper certainly adopts provocative 
positions on a host of issues related to race, genetics, and IQ. However, none of these positions 
are to be excluded from the current scientific and philosophical debates as long as they are 
backed up with logical argumentation and empirical evidence, and they deserve to be disputed 
rather than disparaged” (van Leeuwen & Herschbach, 2020, p. 149). 
 
While much of what is said about race and genetics in Cofnas’s article will be seen as 
provocative, none of it can be rightfully claimed to be backed by “logical argumentation and 
empirical evidence,” since for decades most of what Cofnas assumes about racial realism has 
been deservedly disputed as scientifically ​wrong​. 
 
With that in mind, we would like to respectfully point out that when racial realism is described 
only as being “provocative” or “controversial”, that comes disconcertingly close to saying that 
creationism,​ ​anti-vaccination, or climate change skepticism ​are just scientifically controversial 
ideas. Like these fringe ideas, racial realism belongs to a group of ideas that insist on their 
legitimacy ​in spite​ (and not in the absence) of disproving empirical evidence – the quintessential 
definition of being ​unscientific​. So, where the claims made by anti-vaxxers, creationists, climate 
denialists, and racial realists are, by many, seen as provocative, scientists find it lamentable when 
these ideas seep into academic journals where they certainly do not belong.  
 
We firmly believe that scholars carry the burden of preventing unscientific obstinacy from 
entering and distorting the scholarly literature, and we are here concerned that the editors of 
Philosophical Psychology​ either ignored such responsibility or took it very lightly. 
 
A final and obvious point that we find necessary to address is the seemingly racist ideological 
undertones of Cofnas’s article. Indeed, as the editors also recognize in their ​editors’ note​, racial 
realism is historically inseparable from scientific racism and the harmful ideologies that for 
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centuries have fanned and funded it (e.g., Saini, 2019). Though this history should not in advance 
disqualify academic contributions on the topic, serious contributions tend to openly and 
elaborately acknowledge the socio-political sensitivities inherent to conducting such research, 
something that Cofnas’s piece never really gets to, aside from a few glib remarks.  
 
Although we cannot know for a fact whether Cofnas’s contribution was inspired by ulterior 
ideological motives, it is undeniable that his article can reasonably be read as pandering to 
proponents of scientific racism. These strands of society obviously enjoy it when scholarly 
forums publish work that in some way legitimizes their harmful ideas. We therefore wonder 
whether the editors have seriously risked or damaged the reputation of ​Philosophical Psychology 
by publishing Cofnas’s manuscript; we surely find it plausible that many people – professional 
academics as well as students – will interpret their decision as an ill-disguised legitimization of 
racial realism and the murky waters in which these ideas dwell.  
  
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to: Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen, 
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto Mississauga, 3359 Mississauga Road North, 
MN6148, Mississauga, ON L5L 1C6. E-mail: rosenberg.larsen@utoronto.ca 
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Appendix A: Response from ​Philosophical Psychology 
(NB: Email addresses have been removed for privacy purposes) 
 
 
 
Re: ​Philosophical Psychology - Decision on Manuscript ID CPHP-2020-0013 
 
Dear Dr. Rasmus Larsen, 
 
Thank you for your submission of your manuscript entitled "More Than Provocative, Less Than 
Scientific: Commentary on the Editorial Decision to Publish Cofnas (2020)" to Philosophical 
Psychology. We welcome responses to Cofnas’s paper like yours and are committing to seeing 
them appear in print. But there are some issues that mean we will not be able to publish your 
commentary in its current form. We do, however, invite you to revise and resubmit in light of 
these comments. 
 
The primary issue with your commentary is its overall framing as a commentary on our editorial 
decision to publish Cofnas’s paper, rather than as a commentary on Cofnas’s paper itself. As you 
write in your first paragraph: “The purpose of our letter is not to invite Cofnas’s contribution into 
a broader dialogue, but to respectfully voice our concerns about the decision to publish the 
manuscript, which, in our opinion, fails to meet a range of academic quality standards usually 
expected of academic publications.” We do not believe our journal is the appropriate place to be 
debating with the editors. Thus, we expect any commentaries related to Cofnas’s article to be 
explicitly framed as responses to Cofnas’s paper itself. We think this will not be difficult for you 
to do with your commentary, since most of it is devoted to challenging claims in Cofnas’s paper 
by raising philosophical and scientific literatures on race, genetics, and human diversity. To 
clarify the scope of this requirement: it is entirely appropriate in a commentary to argue that a 
paper’s flaws are so significant that it does not deserve to be published. It is also appropriate to 
comment on the moral implications of a paper’s being published. But we do ask that your paper 
be framed as a commentary on Cofnas’ article itself. 
 
Another aspect of your paper we think you might consider revising is your discussion of racial 
realism. You cite many important texts defending biological racial anti-realism. But there are 
scholars who defend biological racial realism (even if many of these scholars would deny 
Cofnas’ thesis that biologically real racial groups differ in socially and morally significant traits 
like IQ). We think your commentary would be stronger with a more in-depth discussion of racial 
realism vs. anti-realism. 
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We welcome a resubmission that makes revisions along these lines, and look forward to 
receiving a revised manuscript in due course. In that case, we will ask Mr Cofnas for a rebuttal. 
Normally, the editors of Philosophical Psychology will reach a decision about commentaries and 
rebuttals without consulting external reviewers. In this case, however, we may decide otherwise. 
 
You will be unable to make your revisions on the originally submitted version of your 
manuscript. Instead, revise your manuscript using a word processing program and save it on your 
computer. As you do, please track your changes via either your word processing program's track 
changes feature or by manually marking the changes with colored or highlighted text. When you 
resubmit online, you should include both a clean version and a tracked changes version of your 
paper, and describe the revisions your made in your cover letter. 
 
To resubmit your manuscript, go to https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cphp and login to your 
Author Center. Click on "Manuscripts with Decisions," and then click on "Create a 
Resubmission" located next to the manuscript number. Then, follow the steps for resubmitting 
your manuscript. 
 
Alternatively, your manuscript can be resubmitted by way of the following link: *** PLEASE 
NOTE: This is a two-step process. After clicking on the link, you will be directed to a webpage 
to confirm. *** 
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cphp?URL_MASK=f43f8d3fff5e4c948df805128e952984 
 
I look forward to a resubmission. 
 
Sincerely,  
Profs. Cees van Leeuwen and Mitchell Herschbach  
Editors, Philosophical Psychology 
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Appendix B: Reply to ​Philosophical Psychology​’s rejection letter 
(NB: Email addresses have been removed for privacy purposes) 
 
 
Dr. Cees van Leeuwen & Dr. Mitchell Herschbach 
Editors, ​Philosophical Psychology 
  
Re: ​Decision on Manuscript ID CPHP-2020-0013 
  
We thank you for considering our manuscript. However, we have decided to respectfully 
decline your invitation to revise and resubmit the manuscript for the following reasons: 
 
In your response you state, without offering any explanation, that you “do not believe 
our journal is the appropriate place to be debating with the editors”. We find this 
problematic since there is plenty of precedence in academic philosophy where journals 
facilitate such a discussion, and your ​editors’ note​ can reasonably be seen as an 
appropriate target of criticism. 
 
Further, in your letter you suggest that we should include a deeper discussion of racial 
realism, thereby indicating that you seem to read our manuscript as ​defending​ racial 
anti-realism. To be clear, we are doing no such thing. We are merely presenting the 
current state of knowledge​ regarding human biological variation that clearly refutes race 
as a biologically salient mode of dividing up humanity. The overwhelming data and 
analyses of human biological diversity demonstrate that the positions of ​racial realists 
are refuted, thoroughly. Individuals who are (still) defending biological racial realism are 
scientifically wrong. A large part of our commentary was simply to point this out. 
 
Since we can only assume that the editors (and the editorial board) of ​Philosophical 
Psychology​ are familiar with the scientific consensus, we are therefore profoundly 
puzzled by your insistence that Cofnas’ piece not only belongs in an academic journal, 
but that it also deserves further and deeper discussion (through published 
commentaries and rejoinders). To constantly re-engage with individuals who 
intentionally deny or obfuscate scientific consensus among the scholars who work on 
that topic is quite frankly not scientifically, or philosophically, acceptable. Neither is it 
morally acceptable in this case, since the ideas we are dealing with can be 
demonstrably rather harmful. 
  
Thank you for your consideration. 
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Yours sincerely 
  
Rasmus R. Larsen, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto Mississauga 
Helen De Cruz, Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University  
Jonathan Kaplan, School of History, Philosophy, and Religion, Oregon State University 
Agustín Fuentes, Department of Anthropology, University of Notre Dame 
Jonathan Marks, Department of Anthropology, UNC Charlotte  
Massimo Pigliucci, Department of Philosophy, City University of New York 
Mark Alfano, Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University 
Lauren Schroeder, Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto Mississauga 
David Livingstone Smith, Department of Philosophy, University of New England 
